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MENTAL FURNITURE #12
Speransky: A Basis for the Theory
of Medicine
©1997 Dennis Leri
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From Body and Mature Behaviour. "The
most fundamental property of the scientific method is that it always
leads up to a point where only experiment, i.e., confronting theory
with reality, gives weight to the true argument and then discards the
others that may have seemed equally or more plausible. It generally
brings to light phenomena that were considered trifling and
unimportant.”
"We are not surprised to find that we know in fact very little of the
properties of the nervous tissue, and discover with Speransky and his
school many unexpected phenomena. For instance, the body reacts
physiologically almost as a fundamentally new entity after certain
irritations of the nervous tissue. (Body
and Mature Behaviour, 4-5)
"[Speransky] has built a theory of medicine on these premises, namely,
that the reaction depends on the sum of irritations of the system
preceding it; the nervous system reacts as a new entity after each
irritation. (Body and Mature Behaviour,
26)
"One thing seems to be established beyond doubt, namely, that the
previous history of a particular nervous system, i.e., the kind of
irritations it has actually undergone, has the most profound influence
on its biological properties. ... Owing to the unique capacity of man
to form new responses, the kind of irritations to which every nervous
system is submitted, varies from individual to individual. The
responses of each nervous system are therefore different even to
identical physical, chemical, or any other stimuli. Closer scrutiny
throws singular light on human nature and behaviour." (Body and Mature Behaviour, 157)
New theories about the nature of life, the nature of the universe, and
the nature of consciousness can be found everywhere. Each new theory
proclaims itself to explain nearly everything and thereby to constitute
a new world view or paradigm. New paradigms -- Buddy, can you paradigm?
-- are de rigueur. The new paradigms rely on the mathematics of
non-linear dynamics to describe the surprising, sudden and seemingly
a-causal qualitative shifts in a system. Non-linear dynamics are the
basis for Chaos theory, Catastrophe theory, complexity theory,
fractals, strange attractors, neural Darwinism, autopoiesis, etc. It is
seen as the key to understanding the spontaneous emergence of
qualitative different processes, properties and forms in living and
non-living systems. The various theories deal with how life or some
part of it came about and what it is. Some of the hottest new theories
concern the notion of self-organizing systems. By appealing to the
notion of self-organization the conditions for the emergence of life
forms and their temporal existence can now be specified. For example,
the Santiago School of NeuroEpistemology and its proponents Varela,
Maturana and von Foerster have given us the notion of autopoiesis,
self-making, to describe the realization of a living entity on its own
terms. Autopoiesis specifies the way an organism is bounded and how
that boundedness can maintain itself in relation to a medium (the
milieu in which it appears). Their rigorous description of the
character of any living entity and its relationship to other entities
has shifted the primary emphasis away from the species as the engine
driving evolution and onto the individual. In older evolutionary
theories individuals were seen as dispensable to the greater good of
the species. In autopoietic theory, individuals are not dispensable but
central to evolution.
If an individual and its behavior are so important then surely there
must be some post-modern notion of what constitutes a state of health
and a state of pathology for any individual. But, here we see that
modernity and post-modernity are woefully deficient in producing such
notions. Consciousness, normal or altered, is explained without
reference to the well being of individuals. Edelman's neural Darwinism,
for example, explains the plumbing and wiring of consciousness and the
importance of the nervous system in its particular relationship to the
organism yet deals not at all with what it means to live a life, a
particular life, your life or mine. But to find someone who poses
questions related to defining health and pathology, who looks to study
those actions constitutive of a healthy mind and body we must go to
early part of the 20th century.
Moshe Feldenkrais often spoke with admiration about Russian researcher
and theorist A.D. Speransky. When reading Speransky's book one is
initially faced with grim, gruesome and grizzly accounts of experiments
that nearly all have the same result: the test animal dies. Animals
have their brains chopped up, frozen, and traumatized in all sorts of
ingenious ways. Pages and pages of slightly differing experiments are
catalogued. But, the grim task of reading becomes a sort of detective
story of ever increasing interest. We travel back in time to Russia in
the Twenties and Thirties. Hard questions about pathology and health
were being asked and put to the test. Numerous twists and turns along
the way led to some very startling propositions being put forth.
In one series of tests dogs are given morphine and after the morphine
takes effect portions of their brains are frozen. After the morphine
wears off the dogs' health cascades downwards in stages that mimic
epilepsy. But, freeze the brain without morphine and the dogs pretty
much recover just fine. Is the morphine a shock to the system? The
animal recovers when morphine is given at the same time as the freezing
or nearly so. Is time a factor? Give morphine long enough after the
freezing to constitute it as a separate perturbation and the same
results are obtained as when the morphine is given before the freezing:
the animal falls into a horrible, seizure punctuated decline into coma
and death. So, the system recovers from one shock but not two. And, the
system that succumbs is a different system from the one that recovers.
Smudgy Karma aside, the experiments give rise to serious questions
about the nature of health, of pathology, and the role of the nervous
system in all functions of an organism.
The question "What is pathology?" Speransky says, is as unanswered as
the question "What is health?" Theories from physiology, biology and
other sciences relating as they do to organismic functioning are not
theories of health or pathology. Medicine has no theory, or rather it
has many theories borrowed from other disciplines. Either way the
result is the same. Ten years or so ago I heard an esteemed lecturer
say the same thing at a U.C. Medical School lecture. Medicine as an art
is a lot older than what we now call the scientific method. Empirically
proven medical approaches whether allopathic, homeopathic, acupuncture
or herbal, no matter how effective, have no theory in the modern sense.
That is not to say they're not systematic or even logical, but only
that the bases for their successes are without theoretical foundation.
From Speransky's A Basis for the
Theory of Medicine: "..Disease was never looked upon as an
independent quality, as a special form of biological processes; the
starting point has always been formed by conceptions of a contrary
nature. Taking as an indicator one or more groups of complex reactions
that go to make up the conception of normality, disease was conceived
as a distortion or alteration of these conditions. From this, it was
rightly concluded that to understand a disease, it is necessary to know
what is normal.”
"But we have also no suitable means of approaching the concept of
normality. ... We cannot define disease as the antithesis of health,
since neither side of such a medal bears any imprint.
"At the present stage of science, what has to be done is to look for
the qualitative distinguishing features within each of these
conceptions. It seems to me, that as far as disease in a complicated
organism is concerned, we have succeeded in solving the task. The form
in which the nervous component of the pathological processes makes its
appearances does not occur under normal conditions. The pathological
conditions are characterized by new reactions. The presence of the
latter is evidence we are dealing with a real pathological process.
Consequently, it is neither the disharmony of phenomena existing in
normality, nor the disorganization of correlation in the functioning of
separate parts of the organism, that defines its pathological state,
but the emergence of new qualitatively distinct processes. The
disorganization of correlations, disharmony, etc., are only a
consequence of these last.
"There is no doubt, of course, that the basis for the development of
neurodystrophic processes in the organism lies in the peculiarities of
structure and function of the nervous system, i.e., in its
physiological properties. But their distortion creates, as it were, a
new type of nervous activity, the appearance of new reactions, not only
unnecessary but directly harmful to the life of the individual. Hence,
the question is one, not of degree, but of form, in other words, of
qualitatively new biological phenomena."(198-9)
In Body and Mature Behaviour
Moshe Feldenkrais takes Speransky's argument concerning the domain of
pathologies relating to poisons, viruses, bacteria or physical trauma
and extends it to the psycho-physical dynamics of human individuation.
Cannot we assume, he hypothesizes, that the pathologies of everyday
life, i.e., various neuroses, will follow the same dynamics laid out by
Speransky. And those dynamics are that the nervous system is really and
truly different in subsequent moments in time; that the same
perturbation will affect the system differently at different moments;
that different perturbations may yield the same response; that
pathologies are not health plus some disturbing agents but self
sustaining autonomous nervous system patterns; and that health being
undefined needs some examples to study, e.g., Yogis and Judo masters.
What means does Speransky employ that Feldenkrais builds upon?
For Speransky the problem begins with trying to find indicators of
health or pathology more subtle than whether the animal is dead or
alive. He has data galore but how is he to make sense of it? "...
Analysis alone is not enough for setting the data in order, for
systematizing them and creating a working hypothesis. Synthesis is
required. ... Confusion in views does not depend on lack of details.
...We have to define the principles which at the given moment are best
capable both of unifying the data..." (405, Theory of Medicine). To see the
forest above the trees, to seek a point of view from which to make
evaluations Speransky seeks to make the case for a unifying view by
generalizing from his data. How exactly are a black rabbit and a white
rabbit different or a tall man and a short one different? Appeals to
blood chemistry, morphology or whatever merely maintain the same
statistical principles. At whatever scale there are indicators
meaningful to some discipline. But, taken together what do they
indicate about health or pathology? While there is no shortage of signs
signifying something to someone the essential nature and mechanisms of
phenomena are elusive unless the search takes a different path.
Speransky, having disabled answers and theories that lead nowhere new,
finds hints in the questions he can now ask. All the indicators in all
the allied disciplines whether formal like physiology and biology or
methodological like clinical medicine intersect in being related to an
emerging image and concept of the nervous system.
Speransky's conceptual leap was practically arrived at through
thoughtful experiment. For a theory of medicine, to start with the
central role of the nervous system "makes it possible to give suitable
arrangement to all other facts, to find the proper place for each
constituent and to determine the order of functioning of the separate
parts." (401, Theory of Medicine)
Speransky's characterization of health and pathology as emergent
self-perpetuating states anticipated much theorizing now current. His
thinking led to him being able to create pathological states mimicking
certain diseases. He was also able to demonstrate that pathological
states could be interrupted and health returned not fighting the
irritant but by changing the state.
For Moshe Feldenkrais, Speransky's hints at the interdependence of all
phenomenal indicators on nervous system functioning gave rise to his
idea of mature behavior. Such behavior is not constituted by any of the
many external indicators, e.g., societal or religious standards. Unique
and dynamical patterns of neurophysical action whether neurotic or
potent make up behavior. Mature behavior is that state of health that
permits one to recover from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune
as well as to form and live a vision of life on one's own terms. A
state of health is not achieved by treating parts of a system but by
effecting a global change of state which connects the world around one
to the world within one.
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